A Static Recognition Mechanism for Indirect Call Based on Static Single Assignment

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• 作者：Shixiang Gao (18)
  Tao Zheng (18) (19)
  Xun Zhan (18)
  Xianping Tao (19)
  Qiaoming Zhu (20)
  Junyuan Xie (19)
  Wenyang Bai (19)
  
• 关键词：indirect call ; static binary code analysis ; address space layout randomization ; embedded system ; security ; pervasive computing.
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：8351
• 期：1
• 页码：110-117
• 全文大小：254 KB
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• 作者单位：Shixiang Gao (18)
  Tao Zheng (18) (19)
  Xun Zhan (18)
  Xianping Tao (19)
  Qiaoming Zhu (20)
  Junyuan Xie (19)
  Wenyang Bai (19)
  
  18. Software Institute, Nanjing University, 210093, Nanjing, China
  19. National Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
  20. School of Computer Science & Technology, Soochow University, 215006, Suzhou, China
  
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

By preventing attacks which exploit stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities, address space layout?randomization is an effective way for embedded systems protection. However, ASLR will probably suffer exhaustive attacks because the pertinence is not strong. At present only coarse-grained randomization has been implemented because one of the key bottlenecks for fine-grained randomization is the dependencies between functions cannot be constructed completely due to indirect calls. As a result, we give a static inter-procedural?backtracking?recognition mechanism in this paper by using intermediate code analysis technologies to identify the destination addresses of indirect callings generated by function pointers.