Hybrid expressivism and epistemic justification

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• 作者：Martin Grajner
• 关键词：Meta ; epistemology ; Epistemic expressivism ; Epistemic justification
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：September 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：172
• 期：9
• 页码：2349-2369
• 全文大小：446 KB
• 参考文献：Alston, W. (2005). Beyond ‘justification- Dimensions of epistemic evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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• 作者单位：Martin Grajner (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology, Zellescher Weg 17, 01062, Dresden, Germany
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

Epistemic expressivists maintain, to a first approximation, that epistemic assertions express non-cognitive mental states, like endorsements, valuations, or pro-attitudes, rather than cognitive mental states such as beliefs. Proponents of epistemic expressivism include Chrisman (Philos Stud 135: 225-54, 2007), Gibbard (Wise choices, apt feelings, 1990, Thinking how to live, 2003), Field (Proc Aristot Soc 96:359-79, 1996, Philos Stud 92:1-4, 1998, Philos Stud 143:249-90, 2009), Kappel (Acta Anal 25:175-94, 2010), and Ridge (Proc Aristot Soc 81:83-08, 2007a), among others. In this paper, I argue for an alternative view to epistemic expressivism. The view I seek to advocate is inspired by hybrid expressivist theories about moral judgments (see e.g. Barker (Analysis 60:268-79, 2000), Copp (Soc Philos Policy 18:1-3, 2001, in: Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford studies in metaethics, 2009), Finlay (J Ethics 8:205-23, 2004, Philos Impr 5:1-0, 2005), Strandberg (Philos Phenomenol Res 84:87-20, 2012)). According to these hybrid views, moral judgments express semantically cognitive or representational states and pragmatically convey the speaker’s non-cognitive mental states via implicatures. I will argue that a particular version of this view can reasonably be extended to epistemic judgments and that it has several advantages over its expressivist and cognitivist competitors. In particular, I will try to show that there exist certain phenomena in the epistemic domain that seem to be best accounted for by expressivist theories of epistemic judgments. However, a version of hybrid expressivism that maintains that epistemic judgments convey the attributor’s non-cognitive mental states via generalized conversational implicatures is able to account for these phenomena just as well without running afoul of the main problems that have been identified for different versions of epistemic expressivism.