Towards a Kantian Theory of Judgment: the Power of Judgment in its Practical and Aesthetic Employment

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• 作者：Dascha Düring ; Marcus Düwell
• 关键词：Power of judgment ; Practical self ; understanding ; Self ; reflexivity ; Aesthetics ; Morality ; Mixed judgments
• 刊名：Ethical Theory & Moral Practice
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：November 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：18
• 期：5
• 页码：943-956
• 全文大小：324 KB
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• 作者单位：Dascha Düring (1)
  Marcus Düwell (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Utrecht, Janskerkhof 13A, 3511VK, Utrecht, the Netherlands
  
• 刊物主题：Ethics; Political Philosophy; Ontology;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8447

文摘

Human beings orient themselves in the world via judgments; factual, moral, prudential, aesthetic, and all kinds of mixed judgments. Particularly for normative orientation in complex and contested contexts of action, it can be challenging to form judgments. This paper explores what one can reasonably expect from a theory of the power of judgment from a Kantian approach to ethics. We reconstruct practical (prudential and moral) judgments on basis of the self-reflexive capacities of human beings, and argue that for the subject to see himself as committed to prudential goods it is necessarily implied that he understands himself as committed to moral judgment. However, to understand the normativity of understanding oneself as a being with practical commitments at all, the aesthetic judgment is introduced: the power of judgment in its pure form of selfreflexivity. We claim that aesthetic reflection and judgment is conditional on the possibility for human beings to enter the space of reasons, and therewith for practical self-understanding as such. The paper concludes with a preliminary sketch of different conceptual possibilities in fleshing out the role of the power of judgment in its aesthetic employment in developing mixed judgments. Keywords Power of judgment Practical self-understanding Self-reflexivity Aesthetics Morality Mixed judgments