Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

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• 作者：Kathrin Glüer
• 关键词：Perception ; Intentionalism ; Inferential reasons ; Justification ; Dogmatism ; Defeasibility
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：April 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：173
• 期：4
• 页码：1007-1030
• 全文大小：494 KB
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• 作者单位：Kathrin Glüer (1)
  
  1. Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).