Family firms in India: family involvement, innovation and agency and stewardship behaviors
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  • 作者:A. S. Ashwin ; Rishikesha T. Krishnan ; Rejie George
  • 关键词:Family ownership ; Family management ; Business group affiliation ; R&D investments ; Indian pharmaceutical industry ; Agency theory ; Family firms ; India ; Innovation ; Stewardship theory
  • 刊名:Asia Pacific Journal of Management
  • 出版年:2015
  • 出版时间:December 2015
  • 年:2015
  • 卷:32
  • 期:4
  • 页码:869-900
  • 全文大小:756 KB
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  • 作者单位:A. S. Ashwin (1)
    Rishikesha T. Krishnan (2)
    Rejie George (3)

    1. Infosys Labs, Infosys Limited, Electronics City, Hosur Road, Bangalore, India, 560 100
    2. Strategic Management Area, Indian Institute of Management Indore, Indore, India
    3. Corporate Strategy & Policy Area, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Bannerghatta Road, Bangalore, India, 560 076
  • 刊物类别:Business and Economics
  • 刊物主题:Economics
    Management
    Business
  • 出版者:Springer Netherlands
  • ISSN:1572-9958
文摘
Family firms and business groups play an important role in many emerging economies. In this paper we study how different aspects of family involvement influence technological innovation in a firm. Arguments drawn from agency theory and particularly the principal-principal agency hypothesize a negative influence of family involvement with respect to technological innovation. In contrast, stewardship theory predicts a positive influence of family involvement on technological innovation. Drawing on these theoretical lenses with contrasting directionalities with regard to the impact of family involvement on technological innovation, we study how family involvement in ownership, management and board of directors, and business group affiliation influence R&D investments and patents obtained by the firm. The hypotheses are empirically tested on a seven-year panel of 172 firms from the pharmaceutical industry in India. Our results indicate that family shareholding and family control over both CEO and chairperson positions have a positive and significant influence on the firm’s R&D investments, broadly lending support to stewardship theory. We also find a positive influence of business group affiliation on R&D investments and patents applied by the firm. Our conjecture is that the high technology opportunity environment in the Indian pharmaceutical industry facilitates stewardship behavior which in turn promotes innovation in these firms. Keywords Family ownership Family management Business group affiliation R&D investments Indian pharmaceutical industry Agency theory Family firms India Innovation Stewardship theory

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