Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

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• 作者：LawrenceM. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
• 关键词：Auctions ; Vickrey auctions ; Multi ; unit auctions ; Reserve price ; Resale.
• 刊名：Economic Theory
• 出版年：2004
• 出版时间：March 2004
• 年：2004
• 卷：23
• 期：3
• 页码：493-505(2004)
• 全文大小：139 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Economics
  Analysis
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-0479

文摘

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders'' reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.