文摘
鈥業t is necessary to a Prince to learn how not to be good鈥? This quotation from Machiavelli鈥檚 The Prince has become the mantra of the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis. Despite its infamy, it features proudly in most conventional expositions of the dirty hands (DH) problem, including Michael Walzer鈥檚 original analysis. In this paper, I wish to cast a doubt as to whether the standard conception of the problem of DH鈥攖he recognition that, in certain inescapable and tragic circumstances an innocent course of action is unfeasible鈥攆ully captures Machiavelli鈥檚 message and its terrifying implications. In particular, I argue that the standard DH thesis is inadequately 鈥榮tatic鈥? it conceives the conflict between ordinary morality and political morality as a stark, momentary and rare paradox of action鈥攁n anomaly disrupting the normality of harmony. As such it misconceives both the extent and the nature of the rupture between morality and politics. In this sense, the argument I shall advance does just involve an exercise in the history of political thought. Rather, I want to suggest that, by virtue of its failure to take Machiavelli鈥檚 insights seriously, the standard DH thesis fails to live up to its purported capacity to capture the complexity and fragmentation of our moral cosmos and that, consequently, it is nothing more than a thinly veiled version of the idealism and monism it purports to reject.