Controlling stochastic externalities with penalty threats: the case of bycatch

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Zinnia Mukherjee
• 关键词：Bycatch ; Voluntary approach ; Marine policy ; Sea turtle ; Uncertainty ; Q22 ; Q50 ; Q58
• 刊名：Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：18
• 期：1
• 页码：93-113
• 全文大小：481 KB
• 参考文献：Abbott J, Wilen J (2009) Regulation of fisheries bycatch with common-pool output quotas. J Environ Econ Manag 57(2):195鈥?04CrossRef
  Baumol WJ, Oates WE (1988) The theory of environmental policy. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRef
  Bisack KD, Sutinen JG (2008) Harbor porpoise bycatch: ITQs or time/area closures in the New England gillnet fishery. Land Econ 82(1):85鈥?02CrossRef
  Boyce JR (1996) An economic analysis of the fisheries bycatch problem. J Environ Econ Manag 31(3):314鈥?36CrossRef
  Cason TN, Mui V (2005) Uncertainty and resistance to reform in laboratory participation games. Eur J Polit Econ 21(3):708鈥?37CrossRef
  Cochard W, Xepapadeas A (2005) Efficiency of nonpoint source pollution instruments: an experimental study. Environ Resour Econ 30(4):393鈥?22CrossRef
  Dixit A, Olson M (2000) Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem? J Public Econ 76(3):309鈥?35CrossRef
  Hansen L (1998) A damage based tax mechanism for regulation of non-point emissions. Environ Resour Econ 12(1):99鈥?12CrossRef
  Hennessy DA, Feng H (2008) When should uncertain nonpoint emissions be penalized in a trading program? Am J Agric Econ 90(1):249鈥?55CrossRef
  Herrera GE (2005) Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding. J Environ Econ Manag 49(3):463鈥?83CrossRef
  Hicks RL, Schnier KE (2008) Eco-labeling and dolphin avoidance: a dynamic model of tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. J Environ Econ Manag 56(2):103鈥?16CrossRef
  Horan RD, Shortle JS, Abler DG (1998) Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices. J Environ Econ Manag 36(2):186鈥?99CrossRef
  Langpap C, Wu J (2004) Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation? J Environ Econ Manag 47(3):435鈥?57CrossRef
  Mrozek JR, Keeler AG (2004) Pooling of uncertainty: enforcing tradable permits regulation when emissions are stochastic. Environ Resour Econ 29(4):451鈥?81CrossRef
  Parkhust GM, Shogren JF (2003) Evaluating incentive mechanisms for conserving habitat. Nat Resour J 43(4):1093鈥?149
  Segerson K. (2007) Reducing stochastic sea turtle bycatch: an efficiency analysis of alternative policies. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs
  Segerson K, Wu J (2006) Nonpoint source pollution control: inducing first best outcomes through the use of threats. J Environ Econ Manag 51(2):165鈥?84CrossRef
  Smith RBW, Shogren J (2002) Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection. J Environ Econ Manag 43(2):169鈥?87CrossRef
  Spraggon J (2002) Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards. J Public Econ 84(3):427鈥?56CrossRef
  Suter JF, Segerson K, Vossler CA, Poe GL (2010) Voluntary-threat approaches to reduce ambient water pollution. Am J Agric Econ 92(4):1195鈥?213CrossRef
  Teisl MF, Roe B, Hicks RL (2002) Can eco-labels tune a market? evidence from dolphin-safe labeling. J Environ Econ Manag 43(3):339鈥?59CrossRef
  Vossler CA, Poe GL, Schulze WD, Segerson K (2006) Communication and incentive mechanisms based on group performance: an experimental study of nonpoint pollution control. Econ Inq 44(4):599鈥?13CrossRef
  Yates AJ, Cronshaw MB (2001) Pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information. J Environ Econ Manag 42(1):104鈥?18CrossRef
  
• 作者单位：Zinnia Mukherjee (1)
  
  1. Department of Economics, Simmons College, 300 The Fenway, Boston, MA, 02115, USA
  
• 刊物主题：Environmental Economics; Social Policy;
• 出版者：Springer Japan
• ISSN：1867-383X

文摘

Previous literature has shown that when there is a deterministic relationship between abatement choices and outcomes, policies with penalty threats can be designed to induce polluting firms to undertake efficient abatement measures voluntarily. We develop a game theoretic model to investigate whether a similar policy can be designed and applied to reduce stochastic bycatch. The policy design would involve a penalty threat that would induce fishers to undertake efficient avoidance measures voluntarily to reduce interactions between fishing vessels and bycatch species. Our findings indicate that both individual and group performance standards (a threshold of allowable bycatch mortalities per fishing season) can be designed such that the penalty threat is sufficient in inducing risk-neutral agents to undertake the first-best level of avoidance activity voluntarily. The optimal threshold depends on the degree of variability in the bycatch level and the discount factor. The net impact of environmental uncertainty on the optimal threshold is ambiguous and depends on the underlying distribution of bycatch mortalities, given the efficient level of avoidance measures. The paper identifies and emphasizes the information requirements that arise when environmental policies involving penalty threats are applied to mitigate stochastic externalities by inducement of efficient (voluntary) abatement behavior. Keywords Bycatch Voluntary approach Marine policy Sea turtle Uncertainty