Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

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• 作者：Ata Atay ; Francesc Llerena ; Marina Núñez
• 关键词：Multi ; sided assignment market ; Consistency ; Core ; Competitive prices
• 刊名：TOP
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：October 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：24
• 期：3
• 页码：572-593
• 全文大小：505 KB
• 刊物主题：Operations Research/Decision Theory; Optimization; Statistics for Business/Economics/Mathematical Finance/Insurance; Industrial and Production Engineering; Game Theory/Mathematical Methods;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1863-8279
• 卷排序：24

文摘

A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25–26:71–79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.