A Pilgrimage Through John Martin Fischer’s Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value

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• 作者：Hannah Tierney
• 关键词：John Martin Fischer ; Free will ; Moral responsibility ; Frankfurt cases ; Guidance control
• 刊名：Criminal Law and Philosophy
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：10
• 期：1
• 页码：179-196
• 全文大小：401 KB
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• 作者单位：Hannah Tierney (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ, 85721-0027, USA
  
• 刊物主题：Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History; Philosophy of Law; Criminal Law; Ethics; Philosophy;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1871-9805

文摘

John Martin Fischer’s most recent collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, is both incredibly wide-ranging and impressively detailed. Fischer manages to cover a staggering amount of ground in the free will debate, while also providing insightful and articulate analyses of many of the positions defended in the field. In this collection, Fischer focuses on the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. In the first section of his book, Fischer defends Frankfurt cases as an important and useful tool in rejecting the necessity of regulative control for moral responsibility. In the second section, Fischer turns his attention to his own account of guidance control. In this essay, I first focus on Fischer’s defense of Frankfurt cases, specifically his response to the argument that the assumption of determinism in such cases is question-begging. I then analyze two objections to Fischer’s account of guidance control. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the metaphor of the pilgrimage, which Fischer introduces in the opening essay of his collection. Keywords John Martin Fischer Free will Moral responsibility Frankfurt cases Guidance control