Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
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文摘
We study the implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE). When each agent’s interim information is only his private signal, we show that each non-revealing MREE is implementable. This is not true for a partially revealing MREE or a fully revealing MREE. However, if each agent learns both his private signal and the market price in the interim, then each partially revealing and fully revealing MREE is implementable.

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