On the generality of experience: a reply to French and Gomes

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• 作者：Neil Mehta ; Todd Ganson
• 关键词：Phenomenal particularism ; Phenomenal generalism ; Phenomenal character ; Naive realism ; Particularity of experience
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：December 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：173
• 期：12
• 页码：3223-3229
• 全文大小：325 KB
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883
• 卷排序：173

文摘

According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta (J Philos 111:311–331, 2014) criticizes this view, and French and Gomes (Philos Stud 173(2):451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.