Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry

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• 作者：Hiroshi Kitamura ; Akira Miyaoka ; Misato Sato
• 刊名：Journal of Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：119
• 期：1
• 页码：17-45
• 全文大小：868 KB
• 刊物主题：Economics general; Economic Theory; International Economics; Microeconomics; R & D/Technology Policy;
• 出版者：Springer Vienna
• ISSN：1617-7134
• 卷排序：119

文摘

This study constructs a model of a relationship-specific investment in a dynamic framework. Although such investment decreases operating costs and increases the current joint profits of firms in vertical relationships, its specificity reduces the ex-post flexibility to change a trading partner in the future. We demonstrate that whether the investment contract deters entry even in the absence of exclusionary terms depends on not only the specificity but also the efficiency of the investment. We also show that an increase in the investment efficiency does not necessarily improve the equilibrium social welfare.KeywordsVertical relationEntry deterrenceRelationship-specific investmentSwitching costs