Solving the Moorean Puzzle

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• 作者：Michael Blome-Tillmann
• 关键词：Knowledge ; Transmission failure ; Relevant alternatives ; E?=?K ; Moorean reasoning
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：February 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：172
• 期：2
• 页码：493-514
• 全文大小：253 KB
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• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature—namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and the Moorean position of dogmatism. The approach developed in this article is, accordingly, ecumenical in that it allows us to embrace two positions that are widely considered to be incompatible. The paper further argues that the Moorean Puzzle can be resolved by noting the relevant distinctions and our insensitivity towards them: once we carefully tease apart the different senses of ‘justified-and ‘evidence-involved, the bewilderment caused by Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy subsides.