Joint misrepresentation with bribes

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• 作者：Nanyang Bu
• 关键词：Assigning objects with transfers ; Strong group strategy ; proofness ; Posted ; price rules
• 刊名：Economic Theory
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：61
• 期：1
• 页码：115-125
• 全文大小：413 KB
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• 作者单位：Nanyang Bu (1)
  
  1. School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai , 200433, China
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Economics
  Analysis
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-0479

文摘

We study the problem of assigning objects to buyers. Monetary transfers are allowed. Each buyer’s preference space contains, but is not limited to, the linear additively separable preferences. A rule maps each preference profile to an allocation. We are concerned about the possibility that a group of buyers may engage in the following kind of manipulation: They make side payments internally and then carry out a joint misrepresentation. A rule is strongly group strategy-proof if no group can gain by engaging in such operations. We also consider several other appealing requirements. We find that the posted-price rules are the only one that satisfies non-triviality, non-imposition, envy-freeness, and strong group strategy-proofness.