The Jeffords switch and legislator rolls in the U.S. Senate

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• 作者：Chris Den Hartog ; Nathan W. Monroe
• 关键词：U.S. Senate ; Congress ; Parties ; Jeffords ; Natural experiment
• 刊名：Public Choice
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：October 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：165
• 期：1-2
• 页码：25-43
• 全文大小：631 KB
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• 作者单位：Chris Den Hartog (1)
  Nathan W. Monroe (2)
  
  1. Department of Political Science, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA, 93407, USA
  2. School of Social Science, Humanities, and Arts, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, 95211, USA
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Public Finance and Economics
  Political Science
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-7101

文摘

On May 24, 2001 United States Senator James Jeffords announced that he was switching from Republican to independent and would vote with Democrats on organizational matters (i.e. votes deciding party membership and majority party status), effectively taking majority party control of the Senate from the Republicans and giving it to the Democrats. This created an unusually well controlled quasi-experimental opportunity for learning about the role of parties in the Senate—it held most important variables constant while one variable, majority status, changed. We use roll call data to evaluate the probability of individual members of each party being rolled on Senate final passage votes, before and after the switch. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom on the Senate, majority status is an important factor in Senate decision-making. Our results show that Republicans were more likely to be rolled after the switch than they had been before, and that Democrats were less likely to be rolled than they had been before. Keywords U.S. Senate Congress Parties Jeffords Natural experiment