Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach

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• 作者：Conal Duddy ; Ashley Piggins ; William S. Zwicker
• 刊名：Social Choice and Welfare
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：46
• 期：2
• 页码：301-333
• 全文大小：774 KB
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• 作者单位：Conal Duddy (1)
  Ashley Piggins (1)
  William S. Zwicker (2)
  
  1. J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics and the Whitaker Institute, National University of Ireland Galway, University Road, Galway, Ireland
  2. Department of Mathematics, Union College, Schenectady, NY, 12308, USA
  
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory; Economics general;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-217X

文摘

We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations—equivalently, dichotomous weak orders—similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to aggregation by Wilson (J Econ Theory 10:89–99, 1975). In this setting we characterize the “mean rule,” which we derive from properties similar to those Young (J Econ Theory 9:43–52, 1974) used in his characterization of the Borda rule. Complementing our axiomatic approach is a derivation of the mean rule using vector decomposition methods that have their origins in Zwicker (Math Soc Sci 22:187–227, 1991). Additional normative appeal is provided by a form of tension minimization that characterizes the mean rule and suggests contexts wherein its application may be appropriate. Finally, we derive the mean rule from an approach to judgment aggregation recently proposed by Dietrich (Soc Choice Welf 42:873–911, 2014).