Voters-preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox

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• 作者：William V. Gehrlein ; Dominique Lepelley ; Issofa Moyouwou
• 关键词：Voting paradox ; Group mutual coherence ; Condorcet winner ; Probability
• 刊名：Quality & Quantity
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：November 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：49
• 期：6
• 页码：2345-2368
• 全文大小：722 KB
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• 作者单位：William V. Gehrlein (1)
  Dominique Lepelley (2)
  Issofa Moyouwou (3)
  
  1. University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA
  2. CEMOI, Université de La Réunion, Saint-Denis Messag Cedex 9, France
  3. Ecole Normale Supérieure, Université de Yaoundé I, Yaoundé, Cameroon
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Social Sciences
  Methodology of the Social Sciences
  Social Sciences
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-7845

文摘

Gehrlein et al. (Math Soc Sci 66:352-65, 2013) have shown that an increase of the voters-preference diversity, as measured by the number \(k\) of preference types in a voting situation, implies a decrease in the probability of having a Condorcet Winner. The results offered in this paper indicate that this relationship is far from being so clear when we consider instead the proximity of voting situations to having \(k\) distinct preference types. This measure of agreement is compared to other measures of group mutual coherence previously analyzed in Gehrlein (Condorcet’s paradox, Springer Publishing, Berlin, 2006). It turns out that our results are completely consistent with the theory introduced by List (Good Soc 11:72-9, 2002) that is based on an important distinction between two different concepts of agreement. Keywords Voting paradox Group mutual coherence Condorcet winner Probability