Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

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• 作者：Matthew McGrath
• 关键词：Evidence ; Perceptual Justification ; Perception ; Content of Experience
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：April 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：173
• 期：4
• 页码：897-905
• 全文大小：334 KB
• 参考文献：Burge, T. (2003). Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(3), 503–548.CrossRef
  McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous, 34(4), 517–549.CrossRef
  Schellenberg, S. (2015). Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence. doi:10.​1007/​s11098-015-0528-8 .
  
• 作者单位：Matthew McGrath (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Strickland Hall, Columbia, MO, 65211, USA
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.