Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

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• 作者：Jonas Waechter
• 关键词：Metaphysics ; Truthmaking ; Negation ; Negative facts ; Facts ; Correspondence theory of truth
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：174
• 期：3
• 页码：579-592
• 全文大小：429KB
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883
• 卷排序：174

文摘

The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem (Australas J Philos 78(1):72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called (Simple), is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of truthmaking theory. Other advantages of (Simple) are noted: it doesn’t require the inclusion of exotic objects in one’s ontology; it doesn’t require any revision of one’s logic or of one’s theory of modality. The solution also allows one to eschew negative facts, tropes and properties while providing a definition of negativity (DefNegativity) for certain literal propositions. The paper ends by rebutting several objections that may be levelled against (Simple).