On fraud
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- 作者：Liam Kofi Bright
- 关键词：Philosophy of science ; Social epistemology ; Decision theory ; Fraud ; Social structure of science ; Veritism
- 刊名：Philosophical Studies
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：February 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：174
- 期：2
- 页码：291-310
- 全文大小：
- 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
- 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language;
- 出版者：Springer Netherlands
- ISSN：1573-0883
- 卷排序：174
文摘
Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs. The phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal. When scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the information stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for scientists to more consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this paper I argue against such promotion of the veritistic ideal. It turns out that a sincere desire on the part of scientists to see the truth propagated may well promote more fraud rather than less.