A Cautionary Contribution to the Philosophy of Explanation in the Cognitive Neurosciences

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：A. Nicolás Venturelli
• 关键词：Explanation ; Dynamical approach ; Scientific models ; Mechanisms ; Philosophy of neuroscience
• 刊名：Minds and Machines
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：26
• 期：3
• 页码：259-285
• 全文大小：494 KB
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Philosophy of Mind
  Interdisciplinary Studies
  Systems Theory and Control
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8641
• 卷排序：26

文摘

I propose a cautionary assessment of the recent debate concerning the impact of the dynamical approach on philosophical accounts of scientific explanation in the cognitive sciences and, particularly, the cognitive neurosciences. I criticize the dominant mechanistic philosophy of explanation, pointing out a number of its negative consequences: In particular, that it doesn’t do justice to the field’s diversity and stage of development, and that it fosters misguided interpretations of dynamical models’ contribution. In order to support these arguments, I analyze a case study in computational neuroethology and show why it should not be understood through a mechanistic lens; I specially focus on Zednik’s mechanistic interpretation of the case study. In addition, I argue for a greater appreciation of the relation between explanation and other epistemic goals in the field, as well as an increased sensitivity towards the associated contextual factors.