Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support

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• 作者：Florian Cova (1)
  
• 关键词：Moral responsibility ; Frankfurt cases ; Abilities ; Alternative possibilities ; Experimental philosophy
• 刊名：Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：June 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：17
• 期：3
• 页码：505-521
• 全文大小：
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• 作者单位：Florian Cova (1)
  
  1. Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, 7 rue des Battoirs, 1205, Geneva, Switzerland
  
• ISSN：1572-8447

文摘

鈥楩rankfurt-style cases鈥?(FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223鈥?39, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two kinds of Frankfurt counter-arguments against the PAP: the direct and the indirect counter-arguments. I then argue that Levy鈥檚 argument, if valid, can shed doubt on the indirect argument but leaves the direct argument untouched. I conclude that FSCs can still do their job, even if we grant that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener can modify an agent鈥檚 abilities.