Varieties of misrepresentation and homomorphism

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• 作者：Francesca Pero ; Mauricio Suárez
• 关键词：Scientific representation ; Homomorphism ; Structuralism ; Idealization ; Modeling
• 刊名：European Journal for Philosophy of Science
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：6
• 期：1
• 页码：71-90
• 全文大小：271 KB
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• 作者单位：Francesca Pero (1)
  Mauricio Suárez (2) (3)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Florence, Via Bolognese 52, 50139, Firenze, Italy
  2. Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040, Madrid, Spain
  3. Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, London University, Malet Street, WC1E 7HU, London, UK
  
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Science;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1879-4920

文摘

This paper is a critical response to Andreas Bartels’ (Theoria 55, 7–19, 2006) sophisticated defense of a structural account of scientific representation. We show that, contrary to Bartels’ claim, homomorphism fails to account for the phenomenon of misrepresentation. Bartels claims that homomorphism is adequate in two respects. First, it is conceptually adequate, in the sense that it shows how representation differs from misrepresentation and non-representation. Second, if properly weakened, homomorphism is formally adequate to accommodate misrepresentation. We question both claims. First, we show that homomorphism is not the right condition to distinguish representation from misrepresentation and non-representation: a “representational mechanism” actually does all the work, and it is independent of homomorphism – as of any structural condition. Second, we test the claim of formal adequacy against three typical kinds of inaccurate representation in science which, by reference to a discussion of the notorious billiard ball model, we define as abstraction, pretence, and simulation. We first point out that Bartels equivocates between homomorphism and the stronger condition of epimorphism, and that the weakened form of homomorphism that Bartels puts forward is not a morphism at all. After providing a formal setting for abstraction, pretence and simulation, we show that for each morphism there is at least one form of inaccurate representation which is not accommodated. We conclude that Bartels’ theory – while logically laying down the weakest structural requirements – is nonetheless formally inadequate in its own terms. This should shed serious doubts on the plausibility of any structural account of representation more generally. Keywords Scientific representation Homomorphism Structuralism Idealization Modeling