The evolution of cooperation with different fitness functions using probabilistic cellular automata
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  • 作者:P. H. T. Schimit ; B. O. Santos ; C. A. Soares
  • 关键词:Cellular automata ; Evolution of cooperation ; Game theory ; Hawk ; dove ; Prisoner’s dilemma
  • 刊名:Computational Management Science
  • 出版年:2015
  • 出版时间:January 2015
  • 年:2015
  • 卷:12
  • 期:1
  • 页码:35-43
  • 全文大小:178 KB
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文摘
In this work, we use probabilistic cellular automata to model a population in which the cells represent individuals that interact with their neighbors playing a game. The games may have either the form of Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove (Snow-Drift, Chicken) games, and may be considered as a competition for a benefit or resource. The result of each game gives each player a payoff, which is decreased from his amount of life. The advantage of such approach is that each player plays with different individuals separately, not as a multi-player matrix game. The probability for an individual having a certain action is considered his strategy, and each action returns a payoff to individual. The purpose of the work is test different fitness functions for evaluating the generation of new individuals, which will have characters of the best adapted individuals in a neighborhood, i.e., have higher values in a fitness function.

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