Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures

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• 作者：Lei Wang ; HongWei Gao ; Leon Petrosyan ; Han Qiao ; Artem Sedakov
• 关键词：cooperative game theory ; coalition structure ; strategic stability ; imputation distribution procedure ; deviation instant ; ε ; Nash equilibrium ; strong ε ; Nash equilibrium
• 刊名：SCIENCE CHINA Mathematics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：May 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：59
• 期：5
• 页码：1015-1028
• 全文大小：243 KB
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• 作者单位：Lei Wang (1)
  HongWei Gao (1) (2)
  Leon Petrosyan (3)
  Han Qiao (4)
  Artem Sedakov (3)
  
  1. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, China
  2. Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao, 266071, China
  3. Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, 198504, Russia
  4. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China
  
• 刊物类别：Mathematics and Statistics
• 刊物主题：Mathematics
  Chinese Library of Science
  Applications of Mathematics
  
• 出版者：Science China Press, co-published with Springer
• ISSN：1869-1862

文摘

The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments. From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.