Relativism, translation, and the metaphysics of realism

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Aristidis Arageorgis
• 关键词：Relativism ; Metaphysics of realism ; Translatability of theories ; Reliable inquiry
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：174
• 期：3
• 页码：659-680
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883
• 卷排序：174

文摘

Thoroughgoing relativists typically dismiss the realist conviction that competing theories describe just one definite and mind-independent world-structure on the grounds that such theories fail to be relatively translatable even though they are equally correct. This line of argument allegedly brings relativism into direct conflict with the metaphysics of realism. I argue that this relativist line of reasoning is shaky by deriving a theorem about relativistic inquiry in formal epistemology—more specifically, in the approach Kevin Kelly has dubbed “logic of reliable inquiry”. According to the theorem, two scientists, who share some background knowledge but follow different appropriately reliable methods, will converge to relatively formally translatable competing theories, even if meaning, truth, logic and evidence are allowed to vary in time depending on each scientist’s conjectures, actions, or conceptual choices. Some final remarks on the relevance of the theorem to the incommensurability thesis that has vexed twentieth century philosophy of science are adduced.