Secure modular password authentication for the web using channel bindings
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- 作者：Mark Manulis ; Douglas Stebila…
- 关键词：Password authentication ; Transport Layer Security ; Channel binding
- 刊名：International Journal of Information Security
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：November 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：15
- 期：6
- 页码：597-620
- 全文大小：1,551 KB
- 刊物类别：Computer Science
- 刊物主题：Data Encryption
Computer Communication Networks
Operating Systems
Coding and Information Theory
Management of Computing and Information Systems
Communications Engineering and Networks - 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
- ISSN：1615-5270
- 卷排序：15
文摘
Secure protocols for password-based user authentication are well-studied in the cryptographic literature but have failed to see wide-spread adoption on the internet; most proposals to date require extensive modifications to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, making deployment challenging. Recently, a few modular designs have been proposed in which a cryptographically secure password-based mutual authentication protocol is run inside a confidential (but not necessarily authenticated) channel such as TLS; the password protocol is bound to the established channel to prevent active attacks. Such protocols are useful in practice for a variety of reasons: security no longer relies on users’ ability to validate server certificates and can potentially be implemented with no modifications to the secure channel protocol library. We provide a systematic study of such authentication protocols. Building on recent advances in modeling TLS, we give a formal definition of the intended security goal, which we call password-authenticated and confidential channel establishment (PACCE). We show generically that combining a secure channel protocol, such as TLS, with a password authentication or password-authenticated key exchange protocol, where the two protocols are bound together using the transcript of the secure channel’s handshake, the server’s certificate, or the server’s domain name, results in a secure PACCE protocol. Our prototypes based on TLS are available as a cross-platform client-side Firefox browser extension as well as an Android application and a server-side web application that can easily be installed on servers.