Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules

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• 作者：Anuj Bhowmik
• 关键词：Asymmetric information economy ; Coalitional fairness ; Core ; Information sharing rule ; D51 ; D82
• 刊名：Economic Theory
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：November 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：60
• 期：3
• 页码：461-494
• 全文大小：707 KB
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• 作者单位：Anuj Bhowmik (1)
  
  1. Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 Barackpore Trunk Road, Kolkata, 700108, India
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Economics
  Analysis
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-0479

文摘

We investigate properties of core allocations in a pure exchange asymmetric information economy whose space of agents is modelled by a mixed market and commodity space is an ordered Banach space admitting an interior point in the positive cone. The information system in our framework is the one introduced by Allen (Econ Theory 29:465-87, 2006). It is shown that the main results in Grodal (Econometrica 40:581-83, 1972), Schmeidler (Econometrica 40:579-80, 1972) and Vind (Econometrica 40:585-86, 1972) can be established in our model. As a consequence of one of these results, the main result in Hervés-Beloso et al. (Econ Thoery 55:545-63, 2014) is obtained in our framework. Finally, we prove that core allocations are coalitionally fair and incentive compatible. Keywords Asymmetric information economy Coalitional fairness Core Information sharing rule