Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
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- 作者：Erik Ansink (1)
Hans-Peter Weikard (2) - 刊名：Social Choice and Welfare
- 出版年：2012
- 出版时间：February 2012
- 年：2012
- 卷：38
- 期：2
- 页码：187-210
- 全文大小：294KB
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Hans-Peter Weikard (2)
1. Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1087, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2. Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands
文摘
We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.