A Survey on the Cyber Attacks Against Non-linear State Estimation in Smart Grids

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• 关键词：Cyber ; physical system ; Security ; Smart grids ; Nonlinear state estimation
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：9722
• 期：1
• 页码：40-56
• 全文大小：283 KB
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• 作者单位：Jingxuan Wang (15)
  Lucas C. K. Hui (15)
  S. M. Yiu (15)
  Xingmin Cui (15)
  Eric Ke Wang (16)
  Junbin Fang (17)
  
  15. Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
  16. Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen, China
  17. Department of Optoelectronic Engineering, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
  
• 丛书名：Information Security and Privacy
• ISBN：978-3-319-40253-6
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349
• 卷排序：9722

文摘

It is well-known that critical infrastructures would be targets for cyber attacks. In this paper, we focus on smart grids. In a smart grid system, information from smart meters would be used to perform a state estimation in real time in order to maintain the stability of the system. A wrong estimation can lead to diastrous consequences (e.g. suspension of electricity supply or a big financial loss). Unfortunately, quite a number of recent results showed that attacks on this estimation process are feasible by manipulating readings of only a few meters. In this paper, we focus on nonlinear state estimation which is a more realistic model and widely employed in a real smart grid environment. We summarize and categorize all possible attacks, and review the mechanisms behind. We also briefly talk about the countermeasures. We hope that the community would be able to come up with a better protection scheme for smart grids.