GPRS Security for Smart Meters

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Martin Gilje Jaatun (21)
  Inger Anne T?ndel (21)
  Geir M. K?ien (22)
  
• 关键词：Security ; GPRS ; Smartgrid ; AMI ; Smart Metering
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：8127
• 期：1
• 页码：208-223
• 全文大小：398KB
• 参考文献：1. T?ndel, I.A., Jaatun, M.G., Line, M.B.: Threat Modeling of AMI. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security, CRITIS 2012 (2012)
  2. Telenor: Smart metering white paper -Best practices recommendation by Telenor Connexion (2013)
  3. Gungor, V., Sahin, D., Kocak, T., Ergut, S., Buccella, C., Cecati, C., Hancke, G.: Smart grid and smart homes: Key players and pilot projects. IEEE Industrial Electronics Magazine?6(4), 18-4 (2012)
  4. 3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; Security related network functions (Release 12), 3GPP TS 43.020 V12.0.0 (2013)
  5. SDA: Smartcard Developer Association Clones Digital GSM Cellphones (1998), http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/gsm-press.html
  6. Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P., Scherzer, H., Tinguely, S.: Partitioning attacks: or how to rapidly clone some gsm cards. In: Proceedings of 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 31-1 (2002)
  7. 3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the GSM-MILENAGE Algorithms: An example algorithm set for the GSM authentication and key generation functions A3 and A8 (Release 8), 3GPP TS 55.205 V8.0.0 (2008)
  8. K?ien, G.M.: An introduction to access security in UMTS. IEEE Wireless Communications?11(1), 8-8 (2004) CrossRef
  9. Niemi, V., Nyberg, K.: UMTS security. John Wiley & Sons (2003)
  10. 3GPP: Technical Specification 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security architecture (Release 11), 3GPP TS 33.102 V11.0.0 (2012)
  11. 3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General (Release 1999), 3GPP TS 35.205 V3.0.0 (2001)
  12. 3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS ciphering algorithm requirements (Release 4), 3GPP TS 41.061 V4.0.0 (2002)
  13. Xenakis, C.: Security measures and weaknesses of the gprs security architecture. International Journal of Network Security?6(2), 158-69 (2008)
  14. 3GPP: Technical Specification 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security (Release 12), 3GPP TS 33.210 V12.0.0 (2012)
  15. 3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Closed User Group (CUG) Supplementary Services - Stage 1 (Release 9), 3GPP TS 22.085 V9.0.0 (2009)
  16. Mitchell, C.J.: The security of the GSM air interface protocol (2001), http://www.ma.rhul.ac.uk/static/techrep/2001/RHUL-MA-2001-3.pdf
  17. Stanley, N.: Mobile Phone Hacking for ￡1000. ComputerWeekly (2010), http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/Bloor-on-IT-security/2010/04/mobile-phone-hacking-for-1000.html
  
• 作者单位：Martin Gilje Jaatun (21)
  Inger Anne T?ndel (21)
  Geir M. K?ien (22)
  
  21. Department of Software Engineering, Safety and Security, SINTEF ICT, NO-7465, Trondheim, Norway
  22. Department of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Faculty of Engineering and Science, University of Agder, NO-4879, Grimstad, Norway
  

文摘

Many Smart Grid installations rely on General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) for wireless communication in Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI). In this paper we describe security functions available in GPRS, explaining authentication and encryption options, and evaluate how suitable it is for use in a Smart Grid environment. We conclude that suitability of GPRS depends on the chosen authentication and encryption functions, and on selecting a reliable and trustworthy mobile network operator.