Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation

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• 作者：Deming Zeng ; Luyun Xu ; Xia-an Bi
• 关键词：Asymmetric knowledge spillovers ; Horizontal R&D cooperation ; Vertical R&D cooperation ; Cooperative stability ; Game theory
• 刊名：Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：23
• 期：1
• 页码：32-60
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Management; Operation Research/Decision Theory; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); Sociology, general; Methodology of the Social Sciences;
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1572-9346
• 卷排序：23

文摘

In order to investigate the role of asymmetric spillovers in the stability of R&D cooperation, this paper distinguishes two different types of cooperative partners, and uses a game theory approach to reveal the relationship between asymmetric spillovers and R&D investment in the horizontally and vertically related R&D cooperation. In the horizontal R&D cooperation, higher incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers induce firms to invest on R&D efforts as agreed. However, it is the contradiction between horizontal firms’ attitudes towards asymmetric spillovers that leads to the inherent instability of the cooperation. In the vertical R&D cooperation, our results question the usually held opinion about the effects of asymmetric spillovers on the decision of R&D investment. The incoming spillovers are less important in the innovation process for vertically related R&D cooperation. A firm tends to under-invest on the arranged level of R&D efforts when its incoming spillovers increase. Our results also show that efficient mechanisms to restrain firms’ non-cooperative behavior are essential to improve the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation.