Adaptationist punishment in humans

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• 作者：Robert Kurzban ; Peter DeScioli
• 关键词：Punishment ; Cooperation ; Collective action ; emotions ; Evolution ; Adaptationism
• 刊名：Journal of Bioeconomics
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：October 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：15
• 期：3
• 页码：269-279
• 全文大小：153KB
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• 作者单位：Robert Kurzban (1) (2)
  Peter DeScioli (3)
  
  1. University of Pennsylvania, 3720 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA
  2. The University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK, USA
  3. Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, 11794, USA
  
• ISSN：1573-6989

文摘

Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, George Williams, and Stephen J. Gould, among others, have pointed out that observing that a certain behavior causes a certain effect does not itself license the inference that the effect was the result of intent or design to bring about that effect. Compliance with duty might not reflect the action of conscience, gains in trade might not be due to the benevolence of traders, and fox paws might not be designed to make tracks in snow. Similarly, when person A inflicts costs on person B and, in so doing, generates benefits to C, D, and E (or the group to which A through E belong, in aggregate), the inference that A’s imposition of costs on B is by virtue of intent or design to bring about these welfare gains is not logically licensed. In short, labeling punishment “altruistic-because it has the effect of benefitting some individuals is inconsistent with key ideas in philosophy, economics, and biology. Understanding the ultimate cause and proximate design of the mechanisms that cause people to punish is likely to be important for understanding how punishment can help solve collective action problems.