Intrinsic Interferers and the Epistemology of Dispositions

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• 作者：Sungho Choi
• 刊名：Erkenntnis
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：82
• 期：1
• 页码：199-232
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Ontology; Ethics; Logic;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8420
• 卷排序：82

文摘

It is held by some philosophers that it is possible that x has a disposition D but, if the stimulus condition obtains, it won’t manifest D because of an intrinsic interference. I will criticize this position on the ground that it has a deeply sceptical consequence, for instance, that, assuming that I am not well informed of the micro-properties of a metal coin, I do not know that it is not water-soluble. But I urge that this is beyond the pale, especially in light of the weight of the practical considerations we take when we use dispositional concepts in everyday life or science. In doing so, further, I will formulate a type of belief-forming inference and claim that it confers justification on commonsensical dispositional beliefs like the one that a metal coin isn’t water-soluble.