Scheduling with package auctions

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• 作者：Kan Takeuchi ; John C. Lin ; Yan Chen and Thomas A. Finholt
• 关键词：Package auctions ; Scheduling ; Experiments
• 刊名：Experimental Economics
• 出版年：2010
• 出版时间：December 2010
• 年：2010
• 卷：13
• 期：4
• 页码：476-499
• 全文大小：593.3 KB

文摘

In scientific collaborations, technologies have broadened access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of efficient and equitable resource allocation. This paper presents laboratory experiments designed to compare different allocation mechanisms for access to joint research facilities. Specifically, we study the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, a simultaneous ascending auction (the Resource Allocation Design, RAD), and a mechanism based on submitted rankings (Knapsack). Experimental results show that RAD and VCG are both more efficient than Knapsack, while Knapsack achieves a more equal distribution of resources than RAD or VCG. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories.