Improving Side-Channel Attacks Against Pairing-Based Cryptography
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- 关键词：Pairing ; based cryptography ; Twisted Ate pairing ; Miller’s algorithm ; Side ; channel attack ; Points of interest ; Countermeasures
- 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：10158
- 期：1
- 页码：199-213
- 丛书名：Risks and Security of Internet and Systems
- ISBN：978-3-319-54876-0
- 卷排序：10158
文摘
Although the vulnerability of pairing-based algorithms to side-channel attacks has been demonstrated—pairing implementations were targeted on three different devices in a recent paper [41]—it nevertheless remains difficult to choose an adapted leakage model and detect points of interest. Our proposed approach evaluates the parameters of the attack and validates the data processing workflow. We describe weaknesses in the implementation of cryptographic pairings, and we show how information leakage can be fully exploited. Different leakage models, point-of-interest detection methods, and parameter dependencies are compared. In addition, practical results were obtained with a software implementation of twisted Ate pairing on Barreto–Naehrig curves with an ARM Cortex-M3 processor running at 50 MHz. We discuss countermeasures aimed at reducing side-channel leakage and review the available literature.