Merit norms in the ultimatum game: an experimental study of the effect of merit on individual behavior and aggregate outcomes

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• 作者：Jürgen Flei?
• 关键词：Social norms ; Social preferences ; Fairness ; Ultimatum game ; Experimental economics ; Inequality aversion
• 刊名：Central European Journal of Operations Research
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：June 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：23
• 期：2
• 页码：389-406
• 全文大小：1,222 KB
• 参考文献：Ackermann KA, Flei? J, Murphy RO (2014) Reciprocity as an individual difference. J Conflict Resolut. doi:10.-177/-022002714541854-/span>
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• 作者单位：Jürgen Flei? (1)
  
  1. Institute of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Graz, Universit?tsstrasse 15, 8010, Graz, Austria
  
• 刊物主题：Operations Research/Decision Theory;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1613-9178

文摘

The paper reports the results of an ultimatum game experiment designed to test the effects of meritocratic norms on individual behavior and aggregate outcomes. In one treatment the roles of proposer and responder were assigned randomly. In the other treatment the roles were earned in a general knowledge quiz. The results show that proposers offer significantly less when they have earned their roles and responders have a significantly lower acceptance threshold. Rejection rates are lower for offers lower than the equal split when positions are allocated based on merit: Proposers earn significantly more in this setting. Responders suffer some loss in this treatment. This leads to an increase in overall inequality of payoffs measured by the Gini index when positions are allocated based on merit.