Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

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• 作者：Grisel Ayllón ; Diego M. Caramuta
• 刊名：Social Choice and Welfare
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：August 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：47
• 期：2
• 页码：245-264
• 全文大小：1,397 KB
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory; Economics general;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-217X
• 卷排序：47

文摘

We study the problem of the location of a public facility that generates negative externalities. We consider that agents have single-dipped preferences with satiation: each agent considers a location as the worst, the “dip”, and the farther the location is from the dip, the better for the agent. In addition, an agent might be indifferent between all the locations sufficiently far from his dip, reaching his highest level of satisfaction. We characterize the family of strongly group strategy-proof and unanimous rules. Opposite to previous results without satiation, the locations selected are not necessarily at the extremes of the alternatives’ space.