文摘
In this paper, we revisit the problem of constructing general leakage resilient compilers that can transform any (Boolean) circuit \(C\) into a protected circuit \(C'\) computing the same functionality as \(C\) , which additionally is resilient to certain classes of leakage functions. An important problem that has been neglected in most works on leakage resilient circuits is to minimize the overhead induced by the compiler. In particular, in earlier works for a circuit \(C\) of size \(s\) , the transformed circuit \(C'\) has size at least \(\mathcal {O}(sk^2)\) , where \(k\) is the security parameter. In this work, using techniques from secure Multi-Party Computation, we show that in important leakage models such as bounded independent leakage and leakage from weak complexity classes the size of the transformed circuit can be reduced to \(\mathcal {O}(sk)\) .