Pareto Efficient Solutions of Attack-Defence Trees

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• 作者：Zaruhi Aslanyan (15)
  Flemming Nielson (15)
  
  15. DTU Compute ; Technical University of Denmark ; Kgs. Lyngbyk ; Denmark
  
• 关键词：Attack ; defence trees ; attack trees ; countermeasures ; security assessment ; Pareto efficiency ; multiple criteria
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：9036
• 期：1
• 页码：95-114
• 全文大小：319 KB
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• 作者单位：Principles of Security and Trust
• 丛书名：978-3-662-46665-0
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

Attack-defence trees are a promising approach for representing threat scenarios and possible countermeasures in a concise and intuitive manner. An attack-defence tree describes the interaction between an attacker and a defender, and is evaluated by assigning parameters to the nodes, such as probability or cost of attacks and defences. In case of multiple parameters most analytical methods optimise one parameter at a time, e.g., minimise cost or maximise probability of an attack. Such methods may lead to sub-optimal solutions when optimising conflicting parameters, e.g., minimising cost while maximising probability. In order to tackle this challenge, we devise automated techniques that optimise all parameters at once. Moreover, in the case of conflicting parameters our techniques compute the set of all optimal solutions, defined in terms of Pareto efficiency. The developments are carried out on a new and general formalism for attack-defence trees.