Fictitious Play and Price-Deviation-Adjust Learning in Electricity Market

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• 作者：Xiaoyang Zhou ; Li Feng ; Xiuming Dong ; Jincheng Shang
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2005
• 出版时间：2005
• 年：2005
• 卷：3612
• 期：1
• 页码：p.374
• 全文大小：398 KB
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

Investigate how the level of rationality of power suppliers impacts on equilibrium. First fictitious play was established to electricity market. Then a leaning model Price-deviation-adjust (PD-adjust) was proposed, which inherits main characters of the fictitious play but in a lower rationality because of poor information. An interesting phenomenon is observed in numerical simulations: the errors coming from lower rationality of the agents can be reinforced and often bring the agents extra profits rather than loss, and eventually drive the market to enter an unstable state from the stable equilibrium one. The conclusion is a set of game models identified by a rationality variable should be introduced to understand the electricity market better.