Client Externality Effects of Agents Selling Their Own Properties

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• 作者：Xun Bian ; Geoffrey K. Turnbull…
• 关键词：Principal/Agent conflict ; Asymmetric information ; Moral hazard
• 刊名：The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：54
• 期：2
• 页码：139-164
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Regional/Spatial Science; Financial Services;
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1573-045X
• 卷排序：54

文摘

This study is the first to examine the principal-agent issues surrounding how agents’ efforts to sell their own properties affect their efforts to sell concurrently listed client properties. The principal-agent model shows that listed agent-owned properties induce agents to worker harder over all, but diminish effort dedicated to marketing concurrently listed client properties, leading to reduced liquidity and/or lower selling prices for those properties. The empirical results show that client properties competing with agent-owned properties remain on the market 30 to 46 % longer and sell for 1.8 % less than properties whose agents have no such conflict of interest.