Matching in closed-form: equilibrium, identification, and comparative statics

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• 作者：Raicho Bojilov ; Alfred Galichon
• 关键词：Matching ; Marriage ; Assignment
• 刊名：Economic Theory
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：April 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：61
• 期：4
• 页码：587-609
• 全文大小：531 KB
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• 作者单位：Raicho Bojilov (1)
  Alfred Galichon (2) (3)
  
  1. Department of Economics, École polytechnique, Route de Saclay, 91128, Palaiseau, France
  2. Economics Department, Courant Institute, New York University, 19 W 4th Street, New York, NY, 10012, USA
  3. Economics Department, Sciences Po., Paris, France
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Economics
  Analysis
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-0479

文摘

This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are normal, and when the heterogeneity in tastes is of the continuous logit type, as in Choo and Siow (J Polit Econ 114:172–201, 2006), we show that the optimal matching distribution is also jointly normal and can be computed in closed form from the model primitives. Conversely, the quadratic surplus function can be identified from the optimal matching distribution, also in closed-form. The closed-form formulas make it computationally easy to solve problems with even a very large number of matches and allow for quantitative predictions about the evolution of the solution as the technology and the characteristics of the matching populations change.