Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：S. McKay Price (1)
  Jesus M. Salas (1)
  C. F. Sirmans (2)
  
  1. Perella Department of Finance ; Lehigh University ; 621 Taylor Street ; Bethlehem ; PA ; 18015 ; USA
  2. College of Business ; Florida State University ; 821 Academic Way ; Tallahassee ; FL ; 32306-1110 ; USA
  
• 关键词：Voluntary disclosure ; Conference calls ; Governance ; Compensation ; Entrenchment ; Institutions ; REITs ; D80 ; D82 ; G10 ; G30 ; G32 ; G34
• 刊名：The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：February 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：50
• 期：2
• 页码：181-206
• 全文大小：381 KB
• 参考文献：1. Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2005). The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. / Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 343鈥?76. CrossRef
  2. Allen, P. R., & Sirmans, C. F. (1987). An analysis of gains to acquiring firm鈥檚 shareholders, the special case of REITs. / Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 175鈥?84. CrossRef
  3. An, H., Hardin, W., & Wu, Z. (2012). Information asymmetry and corporate liquidity management: evidence from real estate investment trusts. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45, 678鈥?04. CrossRef
  4. Anglin, P., Edelstein, R., Gao, Y., & Tsang, D. (2011). How does corporate governance affect the quality of investor information? The curious case of REITs. / Journal of Real Estate Research, 33(1), 1鈥?3.
  5. Baik, B., Billings, B. K., & Morton, R. M. (2008). Reliability and transparency of non-GAAP disclosures by real estate investment trusts (REITs). / Accounting Review, 83(2), 271鈥?01. CrossRef
  6. Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. / Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 409鈥?33. CrossRef
  7. Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What matters in corporate governance? / The Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 783鈥?27. CrossRef
  8. Benner, M. J., & Ranganathan, R. (2012). Offsetting illegitimacy? How pressures from securities analysts influence incumbents in the face of new technologies. / Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 213鈥?33. CrossRef
  9. Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. L. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. / The Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1411鈥?438. CrossRef
  10. Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. / The Accounting Review, 72(3), 323鈥?49.
  11. Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. / Journal of Financial Economics, 35(3), 371鈥?90. CrossRef
  12. Brown, D. T. (2000). Liquidity and liquidation: evidence from real estate investment trusts. / Journal of Finance, 55(1), 469鈥?85. CrossRef
  13. Brown, S., Hillegeist, S. A., & Lo, K. (2004). Conference calls and information asymmetry. / Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37(3), 343鈥?66. CrossRef
  14. Bushee, D. J., Matsumoto, D. A., & Miller, G. S. (2003). Open versus closed conference calls: the determinants and effects of broadening access to disclosure. / The Accounting Review, 34, 149鈥?80.
  15. Chui, A. C. W., Titman, S., & Wei, K. C. J. (2003). Intra-industry momentum: the case of REITs. / Journal of Financial Markets, 6(3), 363鈥?87. CrossRef
  16. Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. / Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 431鈥?68. CrossRef
  17. Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: does one size fit all? / Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329鈥?56. CrossRef
  18. Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. / Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371鈥?06. CrossRef
  19. Damodaran, A., & Liu, C. H. (1993). Insider trading as a signal of private information. / Review of Financial Studies, 6(1), 79鈥?19. CrossRef
  20. Diamond, D., & Verrecchia, R. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. / Journal of Finance, 66, 1325鈥?355. CrossRef
  21. Doran, J. S., Peterson, D. R., & Price, S. M. (2012). Earnings conference call content and stock price: the case of REITs. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45(2), 402鈥?34. CrossRef
  22. Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. / Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35鈥?4. CrossRef
  23. Eng, L. L., & Mak, Y. T. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. / Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), 325鈥?45. CrossRef
  24. Feng, Z., Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2005). How important is the board of directors to REIT performance? / Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 11(3), 281鈥?94.
  25. Feng, Z., Ghosh, C., He, F., & Sirmans, C. F. (2010). Institutional monitoring and REIT CEO compensation. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 40(4), 446鈥?79. CrossRef
  26. Feng, Z., Price, S. M., & Sirmans, C. F. (2011). An overview of equity real estate investment trusts (REITs): 1993鈥?009. / Journal of Real Estate Literature, 19(2), 307鈥?43.
  27. Francis, J. R., Khurana, I. K., & Pereira, R. (2005). Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world. / The Accounting Review, 80(4), 1125鈥?162. CrossRef
  28. Francis, J., Nanda, D., & Olsson, P. (2008). Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and the cost of capital. / Journal of Accounting Research, 46(1), 53鈥?9. CrossRef
  29. Frankel, R. M., Johnson, M., & Skinner, D. J. (1999). An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium. / Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 133鈥?50. CrossRef
  30. Gentry, W. M., Kemsley, D., & Mayer, C. J. (2003). Dividend taxes and share prices: evidence from real estate investment trusts. / Journal of Finance, 58(1), 261鈥?82. CrossRef
  31. Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2003). Board independence, ownership structure and performance: evidence from real estate investment trusts. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 26(2/3), 287鈥?18. CrossRef
  32. Gillan, S. L. (2006). Recent developments in corporate governance: an overview. / Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 381鈥?02. CrossRef
  33. Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. / Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107鈥?56. CrossRef
  34. Griffith, J. M., Najand, M., & Weeks, H. S. (2011). What influences changes in REIT CEO compensation? Evidence from panel data. / Journal of Real Estate Research, 33(2), 209鈥?32.
  35. Hartzell, J. C., Kallberg, J. G., & Liu, C. H. (2008). The role of corporate governance in initial public offerings: evidence from real estate investment trusts. / Journal of Law and Economics, 51(3), 539鈥?62. CrossRef
  36. Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. / Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405鈥?40. CrossRef
  37. Healy, P. M., Hutton, A., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. / Contemporary Accounting Research, 16, 485鈥?20. CrossRef
  38. Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. / Econometrica, 47(1), 153鈥?61. CrossRef
  39. Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2012). Information disclosure and corporate governance. / Journal of Finance, 67(1), 195鈥?33. CrossRef
  40. Howe, J. S., & Shilling, J. D. (1988). Capital structure theory and REIT security offerings. / Journal of Finance, 43(4), 983鈥?93. CrossRef
  41. Jaffe, J. F. (1991). Taxes and the capital structure of parnerships, REIT鈥檚, and related entities. / Journal of Finance, 46(1), 401鈥?07. CrossRef
  42. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial-revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control-systems. / Journal of Finance, 48, 831鈥?80. CrossRef
  43. Kallberg, J. G., Liu, C. H., & Trzcinka, C. (2000). The value added from investment managers: an examination of funds of REITs. / Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35(3), 387鈥?08. CrossRef
  44. Kang, S. H., & Zhao, Y. (2010). Information content and value relevance of depreciation: a cross-industry analysis. / The Accounting Review, 85(1), 227鈥?60. CrossRef
  45. Karamanou, I., & Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: an empirical analysis. / Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 453鈥?86. CrossRef
  46. Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. / Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2), 246鈥?71. CrossRef
  47. Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure. / Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91鈥?24. CrossRef
  48. Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. / Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 308鈥?28. CrossRef
  49. Ling, D. C., & Ryngaert, M. (1997). Valuation uncertainty, institutional involvement, and the underpricing of IPOs: the case of REITs. / Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 433鈥?56. CrossRef
  50. Matsumoto, D., Pronk, M., & Roelofsen, E. (2011). What makes conference calls useful? The information content of managers鈥?presentations and analysts鈥?discussion sessions. / Accounting Review, 86(4), 1383鈥?414. CrossRef
  51. NIRI. (2004). / Standards of practice for investor relations. Vienna: National Investor Relations Institute.
  52. O鈥橞rien, P. C., & Bhushan, R. (1990). Analyst following and institutional ownership. / Journal of Accounting Research, 28(1), 55鈥?6. CrossRef
  53. Parrino, R., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. / Journal of Financial Economics, 68(1), 3鈥?6. CrossRef
  54. Price, S. M., Doran, J. S., Peterson, D. R., & Bliss, B. A. (2012). Earnings conference calls and stock returns: the incremental informativeness of conference call tone. / Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(4), 992鈥?011. CrossRef
  55. Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2009). Shareholder litigation and change sin disclosure behavior. / Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47(1), 139鈥?56.
  56. Vincent, L. (1999). The information content of funds from operation (FFO) for real estate investment trusts (REITs). / Journal of Accounting and Economics, 26, 69鈥?04. CrossRef
  57. Walkling, R. A., & Cai, J. (2011). Shareholders鈥?say on pay: does it create value? / Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(2), 299鈥?39. CrossRef
  58. Walkling, R. A., Garner, J., & Cai, J. (2009). Electing directors. / The Journal of Finance, 64(5), 2389鈥?421. CrossRef
  59. Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. / Academy of Management Review, 15, 421鈥?58.
  60. Wang, K., Chan, S. H., & Gau, G. W. (1992). Initial public offerings and equity securities, anomalous evidence using REITs. / Journal of Financial Economics, 31(3), 381鈥?10. CrossRef
  61. Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. / Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431鈥?60. CrossRef
  62. Wiersema, M. F., & Zhang, Y. (2011). CEO dismissal: the role of investment analysts. / Strategic Management Journal, 32(11), 1161鈥?182. CrossRef
  63. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. / Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185鈥?11. CrossRef
  64. Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1996). Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. / Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(3), 507鈥?29. CrossRef
  65. Zhao, Y., Davis, M., & Berry, K. T. (2009). Disclosure channel and cost of capital: evidence from open vs closed conference calls. / Review of Accounting and Finance, 8(3), 253鈥?78. CrossRef
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Regional Science
  Finance and Banking
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-045X

文摘

We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push for more frequent and longer conference calls in order to obtain more information with which to evaluate their investment. While independent directors push to hold conference calls, they may also prefer to have shorter conference calls to avoid potential lawsuits, proprietary costs, and/or loss of reputation that can arise from releasing too much information. Entrenched executives seek to minimize risk (such as employment and/or litigation risk) by limiting the length of conference calls or by avoiding conference calls altogether. In addition, contrary to recently proposed hypotheses, we find that executives do not receive additional compensation for bearing the risks of holding voluntary conference calls.