In Defense of Eating Meat

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• 作者：Timothy Hsiao (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy ; Florida State University ; 151 Dodd Hall ; Tallahassee ; FL ; 32306-1500 ; USA
  
• 关键词：Animal ethics ; Vegetarianism ; Moral status ; Sentience
• 刊名：Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：April 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：28
• 期：2
• 页码：277-291
• 全文大小：177 KB
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• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Ethics
  Evolutionary Biology
  Agricultural Economics
  Theory of Medicine and Bioethics
  Plant Sciences
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-322X

文摘

Some arguments for moral vegetarianism proceed by appealing to widely held beliefs about the immorality of causing unjustified pain. Combined with the claim that meat is not needed for our nourishment and that killing animals for this reason causes them unjustified pain, they yield the conclusion that eating meat is immoral. However, what counts as a good enough reason for causing pain will depend largely on what we think about the moral status of animals. Implicit in these arguments is the claim that sentience is sufficient for having moral status. These arguments, however, fail to specify the conceptual connection between the two. I argue in this paper that sentience is not sufficient for moral status. Thus, although animals experience pain as it is physically bad, their experience of it is not in itself morally bad. They are harmed in feeling pain, but this harm is not of a moral kind. This distinction parallels the more familiar distinction between moral and non-moral goods. When considered, this significantly mitigates the force of sentience-based arguments for moral vegetarianism. Since animals lack moral status, it is not wrong to eat meat, even if this is not essential to nutrition.