Complicity, Collectives, and Killing in War*

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• 作者：Seth Lazar
• 刊名：Law and Philosophy
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：August 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：35
• 期：4
• 页码：365-389
• 全文大小：386 KB
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Law
  Law Theory and Philosophy
  Philosophy of Law
  Social Sciences
  Political Science
  Logic
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0522
• 卷排序：35

文摘

Recent work on the ethics of war has struggled to simultaneously justify two central tenets of international law: the Permission to kill enemy combatants, and the Prohibition on targeting enemy noncombatants. Recently, just war theorists have turned to collectivist considerations as a way out of this problem. In this paper, I reject the argument that all and only unjust combatants are liable to be killed in virtue of their complicity in the wrongful war fought by their side, and that noncombatants are not permissible targets because they are not complicit. I then argue that just combatants have some reason to direct force against unjust combatants rather than unjust noncombatants, because they should respect the reasonable self-determining decisions of other political communities, when those communities settle on the distribution of a negative surplus of cost for which they are collectively but not individually responsible. These collectivist reasons will not fully justify the Permission and the Prohibition, but they can contribute to that justification.I presented ancestors of this paper at Manchester, Glasgow, Christchurch and Macquarie. Thanks to my hosts and the audiences at those seminars.