Emergence and interacting hierarchies in shock physics

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• 作者：Mark Pexton
• 关键词：Shocks ; Emergence ; Explanation ; Reduction ; Asymptotics
• 刊名：European Journal for Philosophy of Science
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：6
• 期：1
• 页码：91-122
• 全文大小：648 KB
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• 作者单位：Mark Pexton (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, Durham, DH1 3HN, UK
  
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Science;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1879-4920

文摘

It is argued that explanations of shock waves display explanatory emergence in two different ways. Firstly, the use of discontinuities to model jumps in flow variables is an example of “physics avoidance”. This is where microphysical details can be ignored in an abstract model thus allowing us access to modal information which cannot be attained in principle in any other way. Secondly, Whitham’s interleaving criterion for continuous shock structure is an example of the way different characteristic scales interact in shock dynamics. To fully explain the shock structure one must take account of these different scales, and by doing so explanations of shock structure have irreducible aspects. Lastly, the implications of this explanatory irreducibility are examined in the context of explanatory indispensability arguments used in realism debates elsewhere in the philosophy of science. It is concluded that explanatory emergence on its own only supports an epistemic form of emergence. Yet this epistemic emergence is fully objective. Keywords Shocks Emergence Explanation Reduction Asymptotics