Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

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• 作者：Michael Brownstein ; Eliot Michaelson
• 关键词：Intellectualism ; Anti ; intellectualism ; Knowledge ; how ; Skill ; Implicit belief
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：193
• 期：9
• 页码：2815-2836
• 全文大小：608 KB
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Metaphysics
  Philosophy of Language
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0964
• 卷排序：193

文摘

We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to \(\upvarphi \) but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact \(\upvarphi \) is a way for them to \(\upvarphi \). These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to \(\upvarphi \) just is knowing that some w is a way for one to \(\upvarphi \), then an agent cannot both know how to \(\upvarphi \) and fail to believe that w, the way that she \(\upvarphi \)s, is a way for her to \(\upvarphi \). We discuss a variety of ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief in cases of conflict between an agent’s avowals and her behavior. No-belief cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of positing something like “implicit beliefs”—which conflict with an agent’s avowed beliefs—in many cases of apparent knowledge-how. While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to no-belief cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism.