Why regulators adopt voluntary programs: a theoretical analysis of voluntary pollutant reduction programs

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• 作者：Takuro Miyamoto
• 关键词：Environmental policy ; Lobbying ; Voluntary programs ; Cooperation under threat ; free riding
• 刊名：Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：October 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：18
• 期：4
• 页码：599-623
• 全文大小：602 KB
• 刊物主题：Environmental Economics; Social Policy;
• 出版者：Springer Japan
• ISSN：1867-383X
• 卷排序：18

文摘

To explain why regulators continue to implement voluntary emission reduction programs (VP), this study presents a model with multiple polluting firms, a trade association, a regulator, and a legislator who sets a mandatory standard and is politically influenced by the trade association, a representative of the polluting firms. We show that the regulator can implement a voluntary program, which generates less social cost and more aggregate abatement than a mandatory standard. We also find that assigning the greatest importance to the abatement rates of individual firms generates the highest level of social welfare if the damage due to individual firms’ emissions does not depend on other firms’ emissions. However, the importance of the participation rate will increase relatively to the abatement rate as the damage due to individual firms’ emissions becomes more sensitive to other firms’ emissions.